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Emerging Market Challenges:
Moving Beyond Trade to Promote
the Middle Class and Avoid the
Middle-Income Trap
by Penelope B. Prime*
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of the middle class around the world is seen by many as the
next frontier in business opportunities. In fact, the concept of "emerging
markets" is closely associated with the likelihood of a rapid rise in
middle-class incomes; in other words, a large "internal market potential"
or an "increasing purchasing power among consumers."' One report by
McKinsey & Company2 estimated that annual private spending in
emerging markets will reach $30 trillion by 2025.' It has been
estimated that global consumers and proportional spending will increase
from 1.8 billion people spending $21 trillion in 2009 to 4.9 billion people
spending $56 trillion by 2030.'
Another trend, however, raises the prospect that these opportunities
will be tempered, at least in certain markets. The so-called middle-
income trap, also referred to as "growth slowdowns," is increasingly cited
* Director of the China Research Center & Professor of International Business,
Institute of International Business, J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State
University. University of Denver (B.A, 1976); University of Michigan (MA, 1980);
University of Michigan (Ph.D., 1987). The Author would like to thank Drew Matthews for
his research assistance.
1. S. TAMER CAVUSGIL ET AL., DOING BUSINESS IN EMERGING MARKETS (2d ed. 2013).
2. Yuval Atsmon et al., Winning the $30 Trillion Decathlon: How to Succeed in
Emerging Markets, McKINsEY Q., Aug. 2012, at 1.
3. Id.
4. Homi Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION,http*//www.brooking.edu/research/paper/2010/01/global-consumers-khraras.
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as a concern by analysts and policy makers in a growing number of
countries. Middle-income traps have been defined differently by various
analysts, but generally refer to a slowing or stalling of increases in
income and productivity during specific periods of time, especially for
countries once they reach a middle-income range.' Many countries have
seen their average living standards remain in a specific range for
decades, while a relatively small group of countries have experienced
continuous growth and have made it into the high-income range.
These latter countries can serve as sources of policy recommendations to
others. Singapore, Ireland, South Korea, and Taiwan are examples.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the challenges many countries
face in sustaining growth in incomes and to draw lessons from successful
countries that could be helpful in overcoming those challenges. This
Article analyzes three countries that recently joined the group of high-
income countries-Singapore, Ireland, and Chile-and compares them
with three middle-income countries-Malaysia, Peru, and China-that
are finding it increasingly difficult to move ahead. In a world with
rising competition across the technological spectrum, especially from
China, sector and niche options sometimes seem very limited.
In general, economies that have been open to trade and investment
have benefitted from increased competition and access to resources and
technologies, while middle-income countries have been unable to keep
up. The argument proposed here is that in today's global business
environment, openness to trade may be necessary, especially for smaller
economies, but is not sufficient to sustain growth. There is a critical role
for underlying capabilities that are required to increase productivity and
to move up the value chain in production and exports. Studies have
shown that the benefits of also hosting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
will be greater as domestic capabilities improve.' Capabilities, such as
improving labor-force skill levels, facilitate knowledge spillover channels
5. E.g., Pierre-Richard Ag6nor et al., Avoiding Middle-Income Growth Traps, VOX
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/articletavoiding-middle-income-growth-traps.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See generally Eva Paus, Confronting the Middle Income Trap: Insights from Small
Latecomers, 47 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEv. 115, 119-20 (2012) [hereinafter Paus, Confronting
the Middle Income Trap].
9. Thomas Kemeny, Does Foreign Direct Investment Drive Technological Upgrading?,
38 WORLD DEV. 1543, 1544 (2010); Eva A. Paus & Kevin P. Gallagher, Missing Links:
Foreign Investment and Industrial Development in Costa Rica and Mexico, 43 STUD. COMP.
INT'L DEv. 53, 54 (2007) [hereinafter Paus & Gallagher, Missing Links].
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from foreign firm capabilities to local ones.'0 Here, there is a clear role
for appropriate government institution-building and policy.
II. GROWTH AND TRAPS
Recently there has been an upsurge in the work done on middle-
income countries and the danger of these countries falling into economic
trouble despite years of progress." The export and investment
strategies that are successful at lower levels of income do not continue
to produce sufficiently high growth rates forever.'" Much of this
research points to evidence that countries that have moved up the value
chain in terms of exports and those with good education systems beyond
the primary level are more likely to avoid a prolonged slowdown or a
"trap." For example, Eichengreen and colleagues use data from 1956 to
2010 for high-growth, middle-income countries to identify slowdown
events and reasons behind them." They find two thresholds of
slowdowns, one at per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $10,000-
$11,000 and another at $15,000-$16,000 purchasing power parity
(PPP)." Some countries experience slow growth at both junctures."
They define a "slowdown" as slow growth that lasts for at least seven
years.e In their analysis, they identify the following variables as being
associated with slowdowns: an aging population, undervalued exchange
rates, overly high investment rates, low levels of secondary and tertiary
education, and a low proportion of high-technology exports in total
exports.'7
Another example of research on growth slowdowns is Ohno's proposi-
tion of development stages.' 8 Stage 0 is a pre-industrial stage with
dependence on agriculture, extractive resources, or foreign aid. 9 In
stage 1, manufacturing is dominated by foreign investment, and the
10. See generally Kemeny, supra note 9, at 1544, 1545; Paus & Gallagher, Missing
Links, supra note 9, at 54.
11. See generally Paus, Confronting the Middle Income Trap, supra note 8, at 115-16.
12. See Barry Eichengreen et al., Growth Slowdowns Redux New Evidence on the
Middle-Income Trap §§ 1, 6 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18673,
2013), available at http:www.nber.org/papers/wl8673.
13. Id.
14. Id. §§ 3, 6.
15. Id. § 6.
16. Id. § 2.
17. Id. §§ 2, 6.
18. Kenichi Ohno, Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap: Renovating Industrial Policy
Formulation in Vietnam, 26 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 25, 25-43 (2009).
19. Id. at 26, 28 fig.1.
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country contributes only unskilled labor and land.20 In stage 2,
domestic local suppliers emerge with more value created in the local
economy.21 To reach stage 3, locals take over the full array of value-
chain activities from design to marketing.22 This stage depends on
advanced skill levels and internalized capabilities.' It allows the
country to export high value-added products.2 4 In stage 4, the final
stage, the country has achieved the ability to innovate, namely to create
new industrial products.' Ohno places Vietnam in stage 1, Thailand
and Malaysia in stage 2, Korea and Taiwan in stage 3, and the United
States and Japan in stage 4.26 Countries can get "stuck" in each of the
stages from 0-3 for different reasons.27
Two other factors are also important in analyzing growth slowdowns.
The first is the nature of the global market environment. Slowdowns
can no doubt occur in many kinds of global conditions but may be
influenced significantly by the situation at the time. Today, the
importance of external demand for some countries, such as the small,
exporting economies, will mean that the global financial crisis will affect
them much more than others. Also, today the competition from China
in export markets is a new variable in countries' policy consider-
ations.2 8
The second factor is that certain thresholds, such as the share of high-
technology exports in total exports, are indicators of reaching a certain
threshold of development that may be related to the ability to continue
to compete and grow. However, the underlying challenge is how
countries can actually reach those thresholds. For example, it is one
thing to say education is important; it is another to organize the
resources in such a way as to establish a successful, nation-wide
educational system.
Establishing the skills and the capabilities to respond to changing
global conditions to continually move up the value chain is the key to
avoiding and overcoming middle-income traps.29 Both social capabili-
ties and firm capabilities matter."o Social capabilities encompass the
20. Id. at 26-27, 28 fig.1.
21. Id. at 27, 28 fig.1.
22. Id. at 27-28 & fig.1.
23. Id. at 28 & fig.1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 25-43.
28. See Paus, Confronting the Middle Income Trap, supra note 8, at 116.
29. See id. at 118.
30. Id. at 118, 128.
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basic infrastructure and educational systems required for a nation to
compete as well as the ability of government agencies to formulate and
coordinate the implementation of productive policy." Firm-level
capabilities include the following: the ability to produce a range of
products with varying technological sophistication; the ability to move
up the value chain within a sector, diversify across sectors, and sell
products competitively in the global marketplace; the ability to conduct
research and develop new products and services; and the ability to
productively employ increasingly more skilled labor. 2 The success of
building both types of capabilities depends on targeted government
policies that direct resources and design programs to these ends, while
maintaining an open business environment to attract foreign firms and
promote competition in the domestic economy.3
III. EXPORTS, CAPABILITIES, AND GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM SIX
COUNTRIES
To explore the importance of building capabilities to sustain growth,
examples are drawn from six countries. Three high-income countries,
Singapore, Ireland, and Chile, and three middle-income countries,
Malaysia, Peru, and China, are analyzed.34 Their PPP-GDP-per-capita
levels in 2012 ranged from $61,803 in Singapore to $9,233 in China.
While all of these economies have done well by some measures, Malaysia
and Peru have been in the middle-income range for many years. In
1997, China entered the middle-income category,17 and policy makers
there are concerned that China could also become "stuck" in this middle
ground. In 1983, all of these countries had GDP-per-capita levels below
$10,000.3" However, by 2012 there were clear winners, with Singapore
and Ireland outshining the others by a wide margin."
31. Id. at 122.
32. Id. at 123, 127.
33. Id. at 133.
34. The World Bank's definitions of income groups are as follows: high income means
gross national income (GNI) per capita is greater than $12,616; middle income includes
both upper and lower, upper means GNI per capita between $4,086 and $12,616; lower
means GNI per capita between $1,036 and $4,085; low income means GNI per capita is less
than $1,035. Data: How We Classify Countries, WORLD BANK DATABANK, http://data.world
bank.org/about/country-classifications.
35. See infra Table 2.
36. World Bank Analytical Classifications, WORLD BANK (last visited Mar. 8, 2014),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls.
37. Id.
38. See infra Figure 1.
39. See infra Figure 1 & Table 2.
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Figure 1
GDP Per Capita (PPP, Current Dollars): 1983-2012
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Source: World Bank Databank, www.worldbankorg
Table 2
Case Country Population, GDP and GDP Per Capita (PPP)
Country Population GDP Per Capita
Singapore 5,312,400 $328,323,425,996 $61,803
Ireland 4,588,798 $ 200,032,639,699 $43,592
Chile 17,464,814 $ 390,374,472,696 $22,352
Malaysia 29,239,927 $ 501,248,928,886 $17,143
Peru 29,987,800 $ 327,825,011,396 $10,932
China 1,350,695,000 $ 12,470,982,025,051 $9,233
All six countries have had decent savings rates with which to fund
investment, with Singapore and China's nearing 50% of GDP at the high
end and Peru's closer to 20%.40 All of them have also utilized foreign
investment, although, as a share of GDP, Ireland and Singapore stand
out with shares above 15% and 17%, respectively.4'
40. See infra Table 3.
41. See infra Table 4.
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Table 3
Savings as a Percent of GDP, Decade Averages
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s
Singapore 42.9 48.7 48.1
Ireland 20.3 29.1 35.7
Chile 21.6 25.9 27.3
Malaysia 31.8 40.7 42.1
Peru 23.5 17.6 23.9
China 36.2 41.0 47.9
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Table 4
Foreign Direct Investment as a Percent of GDP, Decade Averages
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s
Singapore 9.33 11.60 17.41
Ireland 0.40 5.09 15.02
Chile 2.55 5.20 6.92
Malaysia 2.57 5.83 3.09
Peru 0.07 3.07 3.73
China 0.79 4.14 3.67
All six countries have substantial levels of overall exports, however,
certain comparisons are relevant.42 First, the export share in GDP is
substantially higher in Singapore, Ireland, and Malaysia than in China,
Chile, or Peru.4 3 For Ireland and Malaysia, the share has grown
substantially since 1980."
42. See infra Table 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Second, the share of high-technology exports in total manufactured
exports is shown in Figure 2." Singapore's and Malaysia's shares have
increased the most, with their shares reaching 60% by the end of the
2000s, and Ireland is close behind.46 China's high-technology exports
also increased as a share of total exports." Peru and Chile, on the
other hand, do not export many high-technology products, with their
shares remaining below 10%.4
Third, exports of information and communication technology (ICT)
services show a somewhat different pattern.' Here, Ireland is the top
performer with ICT services as a share of total service exports hovering
at about 60% and reaching almost 70% in 2012.50 China's ICT service
exports have risen from about 25% in 2005 to about 35% of service
exports in 2012.1 The other four countries all report ICT service
exports at about 25% or below, with Peru at just above 10%.52
Table 5
Exports as a Percent of GDP, Decade Averages
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s
Singapore 174.4 172.1 208.9
Ireland 51.3 71.5 91.3
Chile 26.4 29.1 36.9
Malaysia 57.3 91.2 104.3
Peru 17.3 13.4 23.1
China 11.8 19.6 31.1
Source: World Bank Databank, wwwworldbank.org
45. High-technology exports are products with high research and development (R&D)
intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and
electrical machinery. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
46. See infra Figure 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Information and communication technology (ICT) service exports include computer
and communications services (telecommunications and postal and courier services) and
information services (computer data and news-related service transactions).
50. See infra Figure 3.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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2014] EMERGING MARKET CHALLENGES 741
Figure 2
High-Technology Exports as a Percent of Manufactured
Exports 1988-2012
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Figure 3:
ICT Services as a Percent of Service Exports, Balance of
Payments (BOP) Measure: 2005-2012
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While all six case countries have substantial exports, there are a wide
range of outcomes represented. Each has strengths that have helped it
develop, but some have had a better mix of circumstances than
others-by accident or by design. The next section looks at the case
countries in more detail, focusing on the policy environment and growth
factors more generally. Differences emerge in the countries' foci on
capabilities. Comparison of these case countries suggests the following
conclusions: rising incomes per capita do not necessarily equate to rising
742 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
capabilities, as in Chile and Peru; export sophistication does not
necessarily translate into domestic productive strength, as in Malaysia;
macro conditions or the need for reforms can derail progress despite a
good capabilities base, as in Ireland and China; and setting up the
conditions for positive spillovers from FDI to the domestic economy is
challenging, as is shown by even the successful cases of Ireland and
Singapore.
Table 6
Research and Development as a Percent of GDP
Singapore Ireland Chile Malaysia Peru China
1996 1.34 1.30 0.22 0.57
1998 1.75 1.24 0.40 0.10 0.65
2000 1.85 1.11 0.47 0.11 0.90
2002 2.10 1.09 0.65 0.10 1.07
2004 2.13 1.22 0.60 0.15 1.23
2006 2.16 1.24 0.63 1.39
2008 2.84 1.45 0.37 1.47
2010 1 1.79 1 1 1
Note: Data only available after 1996; Source: World Bank Databank, www.worldbank.org
A. Peru
Peru is one of the fastest growing countries in Latin America, reaching
8%-9% GDP growth in recent years." Exports are a key part of the
country's development today." Exports as a percent of GDP reached
23% in the 2000s, increasing from only 13% in the 1990s." Peru's
largest export category is minerals, representing over half of total
exports." Other exports include fish, textiles, chemicals, and agricul-
tural products." Recently, the importance of mineral and fish exports
has risen, partly due to high demand from China. The country has a
53. Elias A. Baracat et al., Sustaining Trade Reform: Institutional Lessons from Peru
and Argentina, at 19 (The World Bank Human Development Network, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 6283, 2012).
54. Id.
55. See supra Table 5.
56. See generally Baracat et al., supra note 53, at 28.
57. See generally id. at 57.
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trade surplus and has implemented policies to promote trade further."
For example, Peru negotiated trade agreements with eleven countries
between 2009 and 2011, including the United States, Japan, and
China.59 In addition, FDI has increased in importance since the 1980s,
reaching about 4% of GDP in the 2000s and is concentrated in min-
ing.60
Peru's continued and increasing reliance on primary exports means
that the country has not moved up the value chain very much. Peru's
performance in terms of high-technology exports of both goods and
services is relatively low,61 and Peru's research and development (R&D)
spending also is very low, at least as of 2004. In the context of
Ohno's stages, one could argue that much of Peru's economy is still in
stage 0.63
B. Malaysia
Malaysia's economy has done very well by many measures. Its gross
national income (GNI) per capita increased from $1,930 in 1985 to
$9,800 in 2012.64 Beginning with exports of raw materials in the
1970s, Malaysia today compares favorably with richer countries in terms
of its export share and high-technology exports of manufactures and
services." So far, the country has not quite reached high-income
status, but the government launched its new economic model targeting
that goal by 2020." However, its economic performance has not
matched other Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, or
Singapore; according to Ohno, Malaysia is still in stage 2.6 Malaysia
is seen as an example of a country that has gotten caught between the
low-cost countries and the more advanced countries that have the
capacity to innovate.68
58. Id. at 1, 28.
59. Id. at 41.
60. Id. at 1, 28; see also supra Table 4.
61. See supra Figures 2 & 3.
62. See supra Table 6.
63. See Ohno, supra note 18, at 26-28.
64. GNC per capita, Atlas method, THE WORLD BANK, http-//data.worldbank.orgindi
cator/ny.gnc.plap.cd.
65. See supra Figures 2 & 3 and Table 5.
66. Aaron Flaaen et al., How to Avoid Middle-Income Growth Traps? Evidence From
Malaysia, VOX (July 22, 2013), httpJ/www.voxeu.org/article/how-avoid-middle-income-
traps-evidence-malaysia.
67. See Ohno, supra note 18, at 26-28.
68. See Flaaen et al., supra note 66.
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The next steps seem fairly clear. In Ohno's framework, Malaysia is
trying to move from stage 2 to stage 3 and therefore needs to build local
domestic firm capabilities to produce and export.6 1 This will increase
the local value added and help increase productivity and living
standards at home. The country's R&D spending has been rising but is
still quite low.70 Flaaen and his colleagues imply from their research
that Malaysia should focus on higher value-added services as a way to
maintain high growth rates. 1  While Malaysia exports ICT services,
growth in the modern services sector has stalled." At the same time,
growth in demand for these services is rising globally, hence, Jimenez
and his collegues argue that this offers an opportunity to Malaysia and
other countries." Currently, Malaysia lacks the skills, institutions,
and capital to accomplish these steps. Jimenez and his colleagues also
emphasize the need to modernize the country's education system.
C. Chile
Chile's rising income levels have placed it in the World Bank's high-
income-country group, and it is often referred to as a model of develop-
ment in Latin America.75  The country followed open trade and
investment policies earlier than many of its neighbors and has attracted
substantial foreign investment." The country has also been ranked in
the top ten of the freest countries in the world in 2012 and 2013."
Much of the investment in Chile has been concentrated in the mining
industry, in copper specifically.78 The economy is not widely diversi-
fied, partly due to the investment attraction of its profitable and
69. See Ohno, supra note 18, at 26-28.
70. See supra Table 6.
71. See Flaaen et al., supra note 66.
72. Id.
73. Emmanuel Jimenez et al., Stuck in the Middle? Human Capital Development and
Economic Growth in Malaysia and Thailand, (The World Bank Human Development
Network, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6283, 2012).
74. Id. at 15.
75. Francisco Gallego & Norman Loayza, The Golden Period for Growth in Chile:
Explanations and Forecasts 417 (Cent. Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 146, 2002),
available at www.international.ucla.edu/mediafiles/gallego-loayza.pdf.
76. See generally Manuel R. Agosin, Trade and Growth in Chile, 68 CEPAL REv. 79,95-
96 (1999), available at http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/3/20203/agosinji.pdf.
77. T. Elliot Gaiser, Chile's Strong Economy: A Case of Positive Policy and Freedom,
THE FOUNDRY (posted Jan. 23, 2013, 11:01 AM), http//blog.heritage.org/2013/01/23/chile-
strong-economy-a-case-of-positive-policy-and-freedom/.
78. Esteban P6rez Caldentey, Income Convergence, Capability Divergence, and the
Middle Income Trap: An Analysis of the Case of Chile, 47 STUD. COMP. INTL DEV. 185, 189
(2012).
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abundant mineral resources, which have received renewed interest from
China in the last decade." Nonetheless, successful pockets of higher
value-added activities have emerged. These "pockets of excellence," such
as forestry products, fish, fruit, and wine, have contributed to the
development of new skills and to higher incomes overall and are
evidence of local firm innovation as well as spillovers from foreign
investment.ao
Exports of these niche products, however, represent approximately
10% of total exports, with copper and related mineral exports represent-
ing over 70%.s1 The data presented in Figures 2 and 3 also suggest
that Chile has not focused on building expertise in high-technology
manufacturing or services." Even in the copper industry, Chile
produces very little of the world's fabricated copper products." In
terms of Ohno's development stages, this places Chile between stages 2
and 3, despite achieving high-income status and joining the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2010.84
Government policies facilitating technology transfer, credit availabili-
ty, needed skill attainment, and funding for research and development
were critical to the emergence of these higher value-added sectors."
Policy makers also understand that appropriate policies are needed to
push Chile's economy toward more domestic innovation and development
of technologies, in addition to attracting more high-technology foreign
investment. For example, the National Innovation Council was
established in 2005, and the Research and Development Tax Credit went
into effect in 2008. Chile's R&D expenditures are very low, at 0.37%
of GDP. Chile's education system and labor-market participation are
areas that need improvement. Growth in productivity in the economy
has declined in recent years, adding urgency to these measures." The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested that the country will need
to seek alternatives because it cannot rely on a global copper boom
forever.89
79. Id. at 186.
80. Id. at 205; see generally Agosin, supra note 76, at 95-96.
81. Caldentey, supra note 78, at 191.
82. See supra Figures 2 & 3.
83. Caldentey, supra note 78, at 195.
84. Id. at 191.
85. Id. at 194-95.
86. Id. at 198.
87. See supra Table 6.
88. Caldentey, supra note 78, at 203.
89. Chile: Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation, INrL MONETARY FuND
(June 14, 2013), http-//www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/crl3198.pdf.
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D. Ireland
In 1990, Ireland's GDP per capita was only 62% of the OECD
average."o Within a decade, its GDP per capita had surpassed this
average and continued to rise until the financial crisis in the late
2000s.1 One of the key factors behind this remarkable success was
FDI." The fact that Ireland was part of the European Economic
Community beginning in the 1970s, and, later, the Single Europe process
helped place the country in a good position to attract foreign invest-
ment.93 It also meant that Ireland received substantial funding from
the European Union (EU) to use toward its development goals.'
However, the country also focused resources, policies, and attention on
proactively attracting foreign companies and meeting their needs to be
successful in Ireland.95
The Irish Development Authority (IDA), established in the late 1950s,
was the main government institution tasked with attracting FDI.96
The IDA slowly built a global reputation for Ireland as an investment
location with the help of generous tax incentives and by investing in
infrastructure and education. 7  Investments in electronics, medical
devices, and pharmaceuticals were especially successful in the 1970s and
1980s.98 These were followed by developments in software, media, and
other advanced services.99 These successes are reflected in the high
share of ICT service exports, as seen in Figure 3.1oo
Ireland's success with foreign investment did not mean that local firms
easily followed. In fact, after several rounds of studies evaluating
Ireland's progress, the lack of spillovers to domestic firms was appar-
ent."o' As a result, the Irish government started programs to change
this and to focus explicitly on ways to link local and foreign firms to help
90. Eva Paus, The Rise and Fall of the Celtic Tiger. When Deal-Making Trumps
Developmentalism, 47 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEv. 161, 161 (2012) [hereinafter Paus, Rise and
Fall].
91. Id. at 163.
92. Id. at 162-63.
93. Id. at 165-66.
94. Id. at 171-72.
95. Id. at 162-63, 165-66, 171.
96. Id. at 165.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 171 & fig.2.
99. Id.
100. See supra Figure 3.
101. Paus, Rise and Fall, supra note 90, at 169.
[Vol. 65746
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local firms build their experience and expertise.'0o One example was
the National Linkage Program that began in the mid-1980s, which later
merged with other entities to become Enterprise Ireland (EI) in
1998.103 EI's task was specifically to increase the capabilities of
domestic companies.'o
These efforts to promote the development of domestic firms achieved
some success. Local sourcing was increased by foreign firms, and new
domestic firms emerged. The local software industry was especially
successful. The need to increase capabilities in higher-technology and
knowledge-intensive sectors became increasingly apparent. With the
expansion of the EU to include much of central Europe, as well as the
opening of China and India, assembly manufacturing left Ireland for less
expensive locations, which also left the domestic sourcing companies
without customers.105
Building a knowledge-based economy is a long-term commitment.
Ireland has a start with its good education system, infrastructure, and
experience with coordinating between the public and private sectors.106
The country has encouraged R&D and increased funding for research but
lags behind Singapore and the advanced countries.'07 The country's
National Development Plans in the late 1990s and 2000s focused on
science and technology, and a new institution, the Science Foundation
Ireland, was created to foster basic research capabilities.'08 Again, a
pattern of deliberate action on the part of government actors can be
seen.
Rapid growth based on construction and consumption took the country
in a different direction in the late 2000s. Unfortunately, some of the
coordinated focus on development goals that previously existed seemed
to shrink, or at least to be overwhelmed by new opportunities to make
money, even if these activities were short-lived. The property bubble
that resulted ended abruptly, leaving Ireland in a severe crisis.' The
long-term adjustments necessary after this downturn eroded some of the
hard-earned capabilities. For example, many skilled people have
emigrated since 2008, and it is unclear how many will ever return."10
At the same time, new start-up businesses have emerged, building on
102. Id. at 163.
103. Id. at 170.
104. Id. at 169-70.
105. Id. at 170, 172.
106. See id. at 168.
107. See supra Table 6.
108. Paus, Rise and Fall, supra note 90, at 173.
109. Id. at 180.
110. Id.
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the entrepreneurs' experiences with existing technology companies such
as Google, Amazon, and Apple, and of course, benefitting from the
country's still low corporate tax rate."1 ' Ireland's future will depend
in part on preserving the capabilities that it has acquired as it works its
way out of the economic financial downturn.
E. Singapore
Ireland's government has been very development-oriented; Singapore's
has been even more so. 1 ' Their proactive government approaches
have been similar. Singapore has also used FDI as the main conduit for
investment, trade, and technology.' Singapore's Economic Develop-
ment Board (EDB) has been the main government body tasked with
courting and cultivating multinationals since its establishment in
1961.1'4 The EDB has been very successful. Table 4 shows that FDI
as a share of GDP was already high in the 1980s at approximately 9%,
rising to over 17% in the 2000s.x'1 Today, Singapore has at least 7,000
foreign firms operating in the country.116
In addition, Singapore has had very high savings rates-over 40% of
GDP and, more recently, almost 500/-which helped to fund its
investment. These high savings rates have been driven by a compulsory
retirement savings program, the Central Provident Fund."' As a
result of the high domestic savings, policy makers in Singapore do not
see FDI mainly as a source of funds but rather as a way to create jobs
and enhance local skills.' They emphasize that job and skill creation
are the main avenues for spillovers from foreign firms to the domestic
economy.119 When needed skills were not available locally or could not
be developed quickly enough, Singapore's government sought out and
encouraged people with the proper skills to move to Singapore. 20
Singapore, like Ireland, benefitted from location and timing.
Singapore's geography, both in terms of having a deep-water port and
111. Ben Rooney, The Celtic Tiger Purrs: Ireland Tops European VC Chart, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:13 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2013/11/21/the-celtic-tiger-
purrs-ireland-tops-european-vc-chart/?KEYWORDS=Ireland.
112. See generally Penelope Prime, Utilizing FDI to Stay Ahead. The Case ofSingapore,
47 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEv. 139, 139 (2012) [hereinafter Prime, Utilizing FDI].
113. See id.
114. Id. at 144.
115. See supra Table 4.
116. Prime, Utilizing FDI, supra note 112, at 144.
117. Id. at 146.
118. Id. at 149-50.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 140.
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being located along key trade routes, helped the country establish
trading as its first industry.121 But more than that, Singapore was in
a good position to take advantage of the developing production networks
in electronics beginning in the 1970s. Texas Instruments invested in
Singapore early on to produce integrated circuits and semiconduc-
tors.122 At one point, Singapore produced the majority of the world's
hard drives.12 None of this was inevitable, however. Singapore
worked very hard to make the country an attractive investment
destination because it was not the only one competing for these
companies' business. Singapore's government invested heavily in
infrastructure, with an eye to the needs of multinationals, as well as in
good living conditions for its citizens and foreign employees.'
Statutory boards were created to focus on specific infrastructure and
service needs, such as energy, telecommunications, air travel, and
housing. 2 1 Many of these boards evolved into government-linked
companies (GLCs), which continue to operate today.12 6
Similar to the situation in Ireland, as the global economy evolved, low-
cost manufacturing left Singapore for southeast Asia and China. 2
This move was anticipated and encouraged as a way to move the
economy beyond labor-intensive manufacturing. 2 1 Singaporean firms
began to invest more abroad at this time as well.'29 Referred to as the
"external wing" strategy, Singapore envisioned utilizing the resources
and markets of the region to allow growth beyond its small economy.ao
Tb support these moves up the value chain, better and different skills
were needed. Singapore had a vision of building a knowledge-based
economy, partly spurred by a national study called "The Next Lap" in
1991.1a1 Technological upgrading at home was required."3 ' Both
foreign and domestic firms were targeted.'33 However, like Ireland,
Singapore had largely neglected the development of its own companies
beyond the GLCs in services and utilities, most of which were small and
121. See id. at 146.
122. Id. at 149.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 148-53.
125. Id. at 144.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 151.
128. Id. at 150.
129. Id.
130. See generally id. at 144-45.
131. Id. at 151.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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medium-sized companies in traditional sectors or contract suppliers to
multinationals.'" This new thrust of policies focused on ways to link
these companies to technological innovation."' Placing this process in
the context of Ohno's stages, Singapore wanted to move to the innovative
stage 4 but still needed to build local firm expertise along the value
chain in stage 3.
This is similar to Ireland, except that Singapore did not experience the
same type of financial crisis. Singapore, as an economy deeply linked to
global markets, felt the effects of both the U.S. crisis and later the
European slowdown, but these influences were not as devastating as
what Ireland went through."a' This may reflect a stronger coordina-
tion of development policy across the economic and political system in
Singapore, or it may be attributable to good fortune. In any case,
neither Ireland nor Singapore is facing a middle-income trap. Both have
been successful with deliberate development policies to build social and
firm capabilities that have supported growth over time.
IV. THE CASE OF CHINA
While policy makers outside of China are dealing with rising
competition from Chinese exports and, increasingly, Chinese multina-
tionals, analysts inside China are worrying about the possibility of the
country hitting its own growth slowdown. The Third Plenary Session of
the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, which
convened in mid-November 2013, released communications that
explicitly referred to proposed reforms designed to avoid falling into a
"middle-income trap."13 1
From an outside perspective, China's growth since reforms began has
been spectacular.' Gross national income per capita was $190 in
1978.'39 By 2012, it reached $5,680, which is the upper-middle-income
range by the World Bank's categorization."' The country's success
with trade is even more striking. 4 1 Figure 4 compares the value of
134. See id.
135. Id. at 151.
136. See id. at 151-52.
137. Xinhua, Reform Roadmap to Announce Dozens of Detailed Targets, XINHUANET
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c132891756.htm.
138. See infra Table 7 (exhibiting China's GDP growth since the 1970s).
139. Hu Jiangun, Sustained Development Leads to Higher Living Standards, CHINA
TODAY (Feb. 7, 2014), http*//www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/economy/2014-02/07/content
594552.htm.
140. Id.
141. See generally Prime, Utilizing FDI, supra note 112, at 150.
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exports over time for the six case countries.142 China's growth in trade
accelerated in the 1990s after Deng Xiaoping reinvigorated reform and
opening policies, and growth further accelerated as a result of China
becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001.1" Exports as a share of GDP in China reached above 30%,
which is low compared with the case countries proffled here but is very
high for such a large economy.1" In absolute terms, China's exports
are over 11% of the world's exports today. 145
Table 7
China's GDP Growth, Decade Averages
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
GDP growth 7.4 9.8 10.0 10.3 9.8
(annual %)
Figure 4
Comparative Export Trade Value: 1980-2012
2500
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500 m
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-#-Ireland
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Source: World Bank, Databank.
142. See infra Figure 4.
143. See generally Penelope Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth:New Leaders,
New Directions?, 53 EURASLAN GEOGRAPHY & EcON. 688, 689 (2012) [hereinafter Prime,
Sustaining China's Economic Growth].
144. Id. at 694.
145. Marc Howe, China's Share of Global Export Market Rises to Over 11%,
MINING.COM (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.mining.com/chinas-share-of-global-export-market-
rises-to-over-11-64008.
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After decades of rapid growth, however, growth in China has fallen to
less than 8% since 2010.146 For years, 8% had been seen as the lowest
acceptable growth rate, as it was thought that lower rates would not be
able to generate enough jobs for graduates of high school and college and
would not be sufficient to reach national development goals."'7  The
prospect of lower growth rates has been at least partially accepted by the
leadership because some of the slowdown is recognized to be a natural
process after such high growth for so long." However, Chinese
leaders do not want growth to be too slow or to face the danger of a
serious, long-term slowdown, and no one seems confident that these far
more negative results will not occur.149
One question behind this phenomenon is whether this slowing is
cyclical or structural. The global economy has seen much economic
turmoil in recent years, especially in countries that buy many Chinese
exports such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union.'
Hence, the cyclical factors seem relevant. Recent estimates that growth
could recover to above 8% in 2014 support this theory.' Much debate
in China today, however, focuses on structural issues, as did the top
leadership's recent reports and targets for reform.152  Internally,
China's analysts seem to believe that while some of the slower growth
may be due to the global slowdown, this does not explain the underlying
factors. 5 3
Thinking about China's situation from a capabilities perspective,
China's achievements look quite good and compare favorably with
Singapore and Ireland. On the simplest level, China is capable of
producing world-class exports.'54  In terms of both high-technology
manufactured goods and ICT services, China has made impressive
strides.55 These high-technology exports have been largely driven by
foreign investment, similar to the strategies of Ireland and Singapore.
146. Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 694.
147. Michael Lelyveld, Jobs Riddle at Heart of Changing China, ASIA TIMES (July 31,
2013), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ChinaBusiness/CBIZ-0-310713.html.
148. Sophia Yan & Dayu Zhang, China Sets 7.5% GDP Target, CNN MONEY (Mar. 5,
2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/04/news/economy/China-gdp/.
149. Id.
150. See generally Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 697.
151. OECD Sees China Growth Accelerating in 2014, CHINA DAILY (updated Nov. 20,
2013,11:27 AM), http//usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-11/20/content17118918.htm.
152. See id.
153. See Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 697.
154. See generally Xiaolan Fu & Yundan Gong, Indigenous and Foreign Innovation
Efforts and Drivers of Technological Upgrading Evidence from China, 39 WORLD DEV.
1213, 1224 (2011).
155. Id. at 1218.
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However, China's own R&D as a percent of GDP has also grown steadily
and is targeted to reach 2.2% by 2020."6
China's central government has focused on two approaches to deal
with the growth slowdown phenomenon: pushing to develop domestic
innovation capability and to rebalance the drivers of growth away from
exports and high investment towards domestic consumption."'7 The
new central leadership has also targeted economic, financial, and social
reforms as part of this larger effort.'
With respect to innovation, national policy has included science and
technology advancement for decades."' This was one of the "four
modernizations" put forth by Deng Xiaoping in the early reform
program.60 The strategy was to rely on foreign technology acquired
through purchases as well as FDI.' 6 1 Studies have found evidence of
spillovers due to foreign investment and trade.' Not surprisingly,
foreign firms tend to be associated with spillovers in high-technology,
while domestic firms are associated with low-technology upgrading.'63
Fu and Gong find evidence of negative effects on domestic firms from the
innovation activities of foreign firms,164 while Li shows evidence that
importing foreign technology alone is insufficient for facilitating domestic
innovation.16 ' From a Chinese policy perspective, relying on foreign
firms or foreign trade forever is not desirable. Long-term goals include
ensuring that Chinese firms become world-class companies. One piece
of this strategy has been to consolidate the state sector into "national
champions."6 6 This has been partially successful in that it has
156. See supra Table 6.
157. Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 694.
158. Id. at 693-94.
159. See generally Yang Yao, In Search of Balance: Technological Development in
China, in COMPETITIvENESS, FDI AND TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITY IN EAsTAsIA 239(Sanjaya
Lall & Shujiro Urata eds., 2003).
160. Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 689.
161. Xibao Li, Sources of External Technology, Absorptive Capacity, and Innovation
Capability in Chinese State-Owned High-Tech Enterprises, 39 WORLD DEV. 1240, 1240
(2011).
162. Fu & Gong, supra note 154, at 1214.
163. See Yih-chyi Chuang & Pi-Fum Hsu, FDI, Trade, and Spillover Efficiency:
Evidence From China's Manufacturing Sector, 36 APPLIED ECON. 1103, 1103-04 (2004); Fu
& Gong, supra note 154, at 1213.
164. Fu & Gong, supra note 154, at 1213.
165. Xibao Li, supra note 161, at 1240.
166. Ali F. Farhoomand, National Innovation Systems of China and the Asian Newly
Industrialised Economies: A Comparative Analysis, ASIA CASE RESEARCH CENTRE (2005),
http://www.acrc.hku.hk/promotional/promotional shownote.asp?caseref=872.
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resulted in some innovative, branded companies, such as Lenovo and
Hai'er, as well as some in the private sector, such as Huawei.' 6 7
A second set of policy initiatives being pursued by the central
government to help sustain growth in China over the long run is the
rebalancing effort."'s Similarly, with too much reliance on FDI,
Chinese policy makers now believe that China should not rely as much
on exports or foreign demand to fuel its growth.16 ' Further, many
foreign countries cannot absorb more Chinese exports because their
bilateral trade deficits are already high.170 These deficits have led to
political backlashes against imports of Chinese products."'
If the expectation is that less of China's GDP will be purchased by
foreigners, then more must be bought domestically.7 2 This primarily
refers to the share of GDP that is bought by consumers. Investment
spending is already very high--over 40% of GDP-so while investment
rates should remain substantial to support future growth, investment
should be directed more towards products and services that would
appeal to domestic consumers.""3 So far, consumption as a share of
GDP has been unusually low in China-under 40%--and has fallen over
time.' Some of the factors hypothesized to be behind this situation
include the need to save for uncertainties without good insurance
options, the high education and health costs, the difficulty of getting
credit, and the lack of employer or public retirement plans. 7 s
The third piece of the strategy to bolster growth is the reform agenda.
While major reforms were part of what drove growth since the late
1970s, many believe that the benefits of these changes have been largely
exhausted.'76 The economic structure still favors producers over
consumers and state companies over private companies. Getting the
state-private mix and relationship right would help create incentives to
start new companies, to innovate, and to produce desired products and
services. Quality R&D with mechanisms to explore the commercial
167. See id.
168. Li Qi & Penelope Prime, Market Reforms and Consumption Puzzles in China, 20
CHINA ECON. REv. 388, 389 (2009).
169. Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 694.
170. Id. at 695.
171. Id.
172. See id. (noting that "the challenges to shift demand from exports to domestic
consumption are formidable").
173. Id.
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175. See Qi & Prime, supra note 168, at 391.
176. See Fu & Gong, supra note 154, at 1215.
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relevance of research outcomes is needed.' At this stage, reforming
the incentive structure and opportunities within the economy may be
more important than building stronger capabilities. However, taking the
next steps may first require successful reforms. 78
China's leaders seem to agree with this assessment, which is reflected
in the announcements about new reforms as a result of the Third
Plenary Session. ' The changes proposed range from allowing farmers
to sell the rights to land in the countryside to freeing up interest rates
in the financial sector and making it easier for private firms to access
capital through the banking system.'so Implementation will be needed,
but the direction of the changes is toward more market-determined
outcomes and more options for individuals both as producers and
consumers.'8 '
V. MEASURING SOCIAL AND FIRm CAPABILITIES
The Human Capital Report82 published by The World Economic
Forum puts together four sets of variables across countries that reflect
fairly well some of the social and firm capabilities focused on in this
Article. The health and education factors identified therein are elements
of social capabilities, and the work and employment and enabling
environment factors are largely firm-based capabilities."es
The overall rankings are given in Table 8.1" The order of the
rankings is largely consistent with the discussion of the relative
strengths of each country's capabilities. By this rendering, however,
Ireland is closer to Malaysia than Singapore, with Singapore further
ahead. Cyclical factors, such as unemployment, are included in the work
and employment category, which partially explains why Ireland is not
closer to Singapore in these macro-level rankings. For a high-income
country, Chile does not score very high in any of the categories,
underscoring the weakness of its capabilities. Finally, China scores
quite well with respect to work and employment, and this is Peru's best
category as well.
177. See Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 690.
178. Id. at 688.
179. Xinhua, supra note 137.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See generally, The Human Capital Report, WORLD EcoNOMIC FORuM (2013),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF-HumanCapitalfeport_2013.pdf.
183. See id.
184. See infra Table 8.
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Table 8
World Economic Forum Human Capital Country Rankings,
Out of 122 Countries, 2013
Overall Health Education Work/ Enabling
employment Environment
Singapore 3 13 3 2 5
Ireland 20 25 9 22 19
Malaysia 22 39 34 18 22
Chile 36 38 49 37 35
China 43 65 58 26 47
Peru 75 82 84 50 81
Source: World Economic Forum (2013).
Table 9
Disaggregated Measures of Selected Capabilities,
World Economic Forum Rankings Out of 122
Singapore Ireland Malaysia Chile China Peru
Social Capabilities
Ease of finding skilled 16 5 12 48 22 85
employees
Collaboration: state of cluster 7 19 12 45 22 90
development
Business & university R&D 4 12 15 37 31 95
collaboration
Intellectual property 2 16 27 40 44 93
protection & property rights
Social mobility 8 21 26 38 59 62
Firm capabilities
Capacity to innovate 18 19 15 56 27 93
Pay related to productivity 3 33 1 28 15 66
Index of economic complexity 7 17 31 74 26 82
Firm level technology 12 22 30 42 63 73
absorption
Staff training 6 19 11 40 42 77
Training services 12 21 17 39 57 81
Source: World Economic Forum (2013).
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More detailed information is found in the components of these overall
rankings. Table 9 lists the relevant parts of work and employment and
enabling environment, distinguishing between social and firm capabili-
ties.18 5
As previously discussed, of the six case countries, Singapore ranks the
highest in most categories, and Peru ranks the lowest. Singapore's
struggle to find enough skilled labor is reflected in its lower rank in the
ease of finding skilled employees.18 6 Singaporean policies encouraging
people with needed skills to immigrate to the country are directly related
to solving this challenge."' At this more disaggregated level, Ireland's
rankings continue to be fairly low compared with Singapore, except with
respect to access to skilled labor. Malaysia's rankings look relatively
strong, both in social and firm capabilities, which bode well for its efforts
to reach high-income status soon. In contrast, Chile looks relatively
weak in both capabilities, despite already achieving a high income per
capita. Finally, although China's GDP per capita is below Peru's, its
rankings in all of these categories are better than Peru's-often a great
deal better. This is consistent with the view that China has been fairly
successful at capacity-building but needs other changes to help ensure
sustained growth.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the middle class seems to be stagnating in advanced countries,
there are many predictions about expected rises in the middle class in
the developing world. For example, the World Bank estimates that in
the past decade, the middle class in Latin America grew 50% and
represented 30% of the region's population by 2009.'"8 Will this
growth of the middle class continue? To increase the chances, Peru and
Chile will need to invest more in capabilities, as will other countries in
the region.
The six case countries studied in this Article each have a different
history, with varying resources, advantages, and disadvantages. All are
"open for business." They all have attracted foreign investment and
have increased their trade over time. However, trade and FDI are
insufficient for sustained growth and alone will not guarantee broad-
185. See supra Table 9.
186. See Prime, Sustaining China's Economic Growth, supra note 143, at 694.
187. Id.
188. Francisco H. G. Ferreira et al., Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin
American Middle Class, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.worldbank.org/en/
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based benefits. The most successful countries in this study-Ireland and
Singapore-have taken very specific, directed steps to link the benefits of
FDI and trade to their domestic economies. Establishing and continu-
ously improving both social and firm capabilities will be key to this
success. Other situations can, of course, get in the way of this process.
Ireland's macroeconomic crisis and China's need for reform are two
examples. But the underlying viability of an economy over time will
depend largely on its ability to establish and improve these capabilities.
